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Can quantum  th eory  and special rela tiv ity  p eacefu lly  co ex ist? *
M.P. Seevinck
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(Dated: August 2010)
For me then this is the real problem with 
quantum  theory: the apparently essential con­
flic t between any sharp form ulation [of quan­
tum  theory] and fundam ental relativity. That 
is to say, we have an apparent incompatibil­
ity, at the deepest level, between the two fu n ­
damental pillars o f contemporary theory . . . .  
I t may be that a real synthesis o f quantum and 
relativity theories requires not ju s t technical 
developments but radical conceptual renewal.
J.S. Bell (1986, [4, p. 9])
I. IN T R O D U C T IO N
This white paper aims to identify an open problem in 
‘Quantum  Physics and the Nature of Reality’—namely 
whether quantum  theory and special relativity are for­
mally compatible—, to indicate what the underlying is­
sues are, and put forward ideas about how the problem 
might be addressed.
Consider jointly the following two theorems: firstly, the 
so-called No-Signalling Theorem in quantum  theory 1; 
and, secondly, Bell’s Theorem stating th a t quantum  the­
ory is not locally causal2. Then, do quantum  theory and 
the theory of (special) relativity indeed “peacefully coex­
ist” (A. Shimony, 1984 [29, p. 227]) or is there an “appar­
ent incompatibility” here (J.S. Bell, 1984 [5, p. 172])? If 
we think the latter is the case—which we will argue one 
should—, does this ask for a radical revision of our un­
derstanding of what (special) relativity in fact enforces?
* Invited w hite paper for Q uantum  Physics and th e  N ature  of Re­
ality, John  Polkinghorne 80th B irthday  Conference. St Annes 
College, Oxford. 26 - 29 Septem ber 2010. C opyright of Oxford 
U niversity 2010.
t m .p.seevinck@ science.ru.nl
1 By quan tum  theory  we m ean non-relativistic  quan tum  m echan­
ics a la von N eum ann, where th e  p rojection  p o stu la te  need not 
necessarily be included.
2 Im portantly , by Bell’s theorem  we do no t m ean a v iolation of 
a B ell-type inequality by quan tum  m echanical predictions, bu t 
only  a  violation of th e  condition of Local C ausality  in quan tum  
mechanics. See section II B.
Or are the requirements set by special relativity quite 
well-understood and should we, therefore, either adopt 
an un-relativistic approach in any future physics because 
relativity is false, or, alternatively, find a new formulation 
of quantum  theory tha t manages to violate Bell’s local 
causality in a relativistically invariant way? Or might it 
be the case tha t a conclusive, and well-understood an­
swer to the central question can only be provided by a 
quantum  theory of gravity?
There is no consensus among contemporary philoso­
phers and physicists as to how one should answer these 
questions. For example, Albert and Galchen (2009,
[1 ]) speak of a “quantum  threat to special relativity” , 
whereas Clark et al. (2010, [9]) claim tha t “[t]he formal 
compatibility of quantum  mechanics with special relativ­
ity is highly nontrivial and is in many ways miraculous.” 
Is there indeed such a formal compatibility? If indeed so, 
can we understand this “miracle”? Or should we agree 
with Albert and Galchen tha t we are faced with a severe 
incompatibility, and in such a way tha t relativity is likely 
to be undermined?
In this white paper these issues will be addressed as 
follows. The doctrine of “peaceful coexistence” between 
relativity and quantum  physics claims simply tha t rela­
tivity and quantum  theory will never be found to con­
tradict each other in those cases in which they do hap­
pen to be talking about the same things—in particular 
the types of causal correlations th a t are possible between 
events. However, we believe it is fair to claim tha t no sat­
isfactory proof of this proposition has so far been offered. 
The reason is the following. Peaceful coexistence is sup­
posed to be guarenteed by the so-called No-Signalling 
Theorems. However, such theorems in fact presuppose 
locality of measurements (i.e., a form of no-signalling) 
and are therefore circular.
This is a first reason to question the doctrine of peace­
ful coexistence. But independent of whether one believes 
this verdict of the no-signalling theorems to be appropri­
ate, it remains the fact th a t quantum  theory is not locally 
causal and thus violates the causal spacetime structure 
of relativity. And because of this latter fact a very good 
case can be made tha t there really is an incompatibility 
here between quantum  theory and special relativity. It 
thus appears tha t instead of facing peaceful coexistence 
we are in fact confronted with armed truce (Peacock, 
1991 [25]).
Section II is devoted to a series of arguments in favour 
of this position. Section III presents a number of ways
2to address this incompatibility between quantum  theory 
and special relativity. Here we will have to necessarily 
be brief, both because of lack of space as well as because 
most of these proposals are still work in progress and not 
at all clear-cut. Section IV concludes via a short discus­
sion. Finally, the Appendix contains a careful exposition 
of Bell’s notion of local causality.
II. ARTICULATING  TH E PRO BLEM  A N D  TH E  
U N D ER LY IN G  ISSUES
A. W hy peaceful coexistence is not ensured
The claim has been made tha t the principles of quan­
tum  theory alone suffice for proofs of the No-Signalling 
Theorems [13, 14, 26]. The most sophisticated proofs 
of these theorems are in term  of quantum  field theory 
and rely on the notion of microcausality or local com­
m uta tiv ity , which means tha t operators which represent 
measurements performed on space-like separate parts of 
a physical system always commute, regardless of whether 
or not they would commute if operating locally (Peacock, 
1991 [25, p. 56]).
The im portant observation is tha t this microcausal­
ity condition does not follow from some set of quantum 
principles, but is in fact postulated because it is “the 
mathematical statem ent of the fact tha t no signal can be 
exchanged between two points separated by a spacelike 
interval and therefore tha t measurements at such points 
cannot interfere” (Schweber, 1961 [27, p. 723]). Indeed, 
Stapp (1988, [33, p. 8 8 ]) admits tha t “relativistic quan­
tum  field theory . . . is constructed to ensure tha t its pre­
dictions do not depend either on the frame of reference or 
upon the order in which one imagines performing mea­
surements on spacelike separated regions.”
However, “a proof of a result based on a theory which 
was ‘constructed to ensure’ tha t result is no proof at 
all” (Peacock, 1991 [25, p. 70]). This conclusion has 
been endorsed recently by M ittlestaedt (2008, [19, p. 2]): 
“The micro-causality condition of relativistic quantum 
field theory excludes entanglement induced superluminal 
signals but this condition is justified by the exclusion of 
superluminal signals. Hence, we are confronted here with 
a vicious circle, and the question whether there are su­
perluminal EPR-signals cannot be answered in this way.” 
Other proofs of the No-Signalling Theorem not us­
ing the assumption of microcausality suffer from similar 
problems because they either implicitly or explicitly as­
sume tha t measurements have only local effects, thereby 
begging the question (Peacock, 1991 [25])3. Of course, 
what these theorems do show is tha t the requirement of
3 It is notew orthy th a t  Shim ony him self abanded  his idea of 
“peaceful coexistence” , as he adm its in (Shimony, 2004 [30]): 
” T he proposal of peaceful coexistence was in fact espoused at 
one tim e by th e  present au th o r (Shimony, 1978 [28, section V]),
no-signalling can be worked out consistently in the quan­
tum  domain, and as such can be regarded ‘consistency 
proofs’. Furthermore, logically, for the desired compat­
ibility between quantum  theory and relativity it is not 
needed tha t one can derive the no-signalling constraint, 
or any other relativistic constraint whatsoever.
But despite this, even if the theorems would be valid, 
then still the desired compatibility would not be ensured. 
The reason is th a t it is highly questionable tha t special 
relativity is inextricably bound up with the impossibility 
of transm itting messages faster than the speed of light. 
As for example Maudlin (2002, [18]) has shown, the com­
patibility of no-signalling and special relativity is much 
more subtle than this. Special relativity is primarily a 
theory about the geometrical structure of space and time. 
And in fact, the tru th  of the theory is perfectly con­
sistent with theories th a t have tachyon mechanisms of 
super-luminal transmission (Maudlin, 2002 [18]; Arntze- 
nius, 1994 [2]; Berkovitz, 2007 [7]).
This raises questions about what exactly special rel­
ativity enforces, i.e., what the letter of relativity is as 
opposed to its spirit. Although we do not want to iden­
tify special relativity with the demand for Lorent invari­
ance, we regard it as a particularly clear and uncontro- 
versial part of the theory (Brown, 2005 [8 ]). W ith regard 
to the possible correlations between outcomes of space­
like measurements in quantum  theory, it is fair to claim 
that, m in im ally , relativity asks for a Lorentz covariant 
story on Minkowsky spacetime of how the correlations 
arise. Is this possible? We will see tha t any attem pt to 
do so and tha t uses the causal structure implicit in the 
Minkowskian spacetime faces great difficulty because of 
Bell’s Theorem.
B. Q uantum  theory is not locally causal: a basic 
inconsistency w ith  relativity?
Bell’s condition of local causality is envisaged to encode 
the Minkowsky spacetime structure for possible physi­
cal interactions and influences between physical systems. 
See Appendix. As Norsen (2007, [21]; 2009, [22]) has 
stressed, particularly noteworthy is the plausibility, gen­
erality, and evident appropriateness of Bell’s locality cri­
terion as an expression of the relativistic causal structure 
of Fig. 1 (see Appendix). If we now assume tha t lawlike 
prediction of correlations is indicative of a causal connec- 
tion4, either directly or via a common cause, then a the­
ory’s violation of the criterion of local causality (thereby
b u t he was dissuaded from it by a  powerful an ti-an thropocen tric  
a rgum ent of John  Bell” . (Shim ony here refers to  Section 6.12 
of (Bell, 1990 [6]) where Bell argues th a t  ‘no-signalling faster 
th an  light’ cannot be th e  expression of th e  fundam ental causal 
s tru c tu re  of con tem porary  theoretical physics.)
4 Brown (2005 [8, A ppendix  B]) rejects th is  view so as to  a rgue th a t  
violations of local causality  do not en ta il non-local causation. He 
rem arks: “Perhaps it is sim ply not th e  case th a t  in quan tum
3excluding common causes) means th a t it posits non-local 
causation; and not mere non-local correlations. But it 
should be noted tha t this not necessarily implies th a t it 
supports super-luminal signalling.
As is well known, quantum  theory violates local causal­
ity, i.e., the theory violates Eq. (2) of the Appendix. To 
show this one takes the beable (or ‘hidden variable’) A to 
be some entangled quantum  state ^  (or density matrix 
p ) 5 and uses suitably chosen observables a and b. The 
formal proof will not be rehearsed here. See for example 
Bell (1976 [3], 1990 [6 ]), and many others6.
It is im portant to comment on some of the facts that 
are commonly overlooked in obtaining the conclusion 
tha t quantum  theory violates local causality. Firstly, not 
needed are Bell’s inequalities7. Secondly, not needed is 
a ‘free will’ assumption whereby one assumes a form of 
independence between A and the settings a, b. Thirdly, 
there is no need for an analysis of the ‘collapse of the 
wavefunction’ as a real physical process.
It is a rather subtle question—see below—whether or 
not special relativity genuinely requires local causality in 
the sense of Fig. 1 of the Appendix (Maudlin, 2002, [18]). 
However, “if one grants this (and virtually all physicists 
and commentators do), then it really is possible to es­
tablish an “essential conflict between any sharp formu­
lation [of QM] and fundamental relativity. That is to 
say, we have an apparent incompatibility, at the deepest 
level, between the two fundamental pillars of contempo­
rary theory. . .” (Bell, 1984 [5, p. 172]).” (Norsen, 2009 
[2 2 ]).
III. WAYS TO A D D R E SS TH E PROBLEM
Can quantum  violations of local causality be reconciled 
with relativity? One can generally distinguish two types 
of approaches in resolving this issue, and which are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive:
mechanics, correlations a re  always ap t for causal exp lanation .” 
(Brown, 2005 [8, A ppendix  B]). We believe th is  position to  be 
u tte rly  unsatisfactory.
5 Indeed, for s tan d ard  quan tum  mechanics A is “a lready suffi­
ciently specified” [see second quote by Bell in th e  Appendix] 
when th e  quan tum  sta te  ^  is fully specified.
6 M uller (1999, [20]) stresses th a t  no space-tim e form ulation of 
quan tum  m echanics is as of yet available—th u s  it can not be 
regarded a spacetim e theory— , and th a t  it is a  hard  job  to  for­
m ulate one, be it in M inkovskian or Galilean spacetim e. How­
ever, despite  being tru e , th is  is not relevant for th e  problem  here. 
All th a t  is needed to  consider th e  question of local causality  are 
predictions for m easurem ent outcom es a t certain  space-tim e lo­
cations as in Fig. 3 (see A ppendix), and quan tum  m echanics does 
give such predictions when th e  m easurem ents and th e  s ta te  to  be 
m easured are  specified. It does not m a tte r  th a t  th e  theo ry  itself 
cannot be taken  to  be a  spacetim e theo ry  on some appropria te  
differentiable manifold.
7 O ur conclusion is therefore safe from some comm on objections
against derivations of B ell-type inequalities (e.g., such as p rob­
lems associated w ith th e  need for Kolm ogorovian p robability  th e ­
ory when averaging over A).
1. The approach depends (i) on the interpretation of 
special relativity (i.e, a specific view on which con­
straints the theory in fact imposes), or (ii) on some 
modification of this theory.
2. The approach depends on (i) a specific interpreta­
tion of quantum  theory, or (ii) on some modification 
of it.
The approaches of the first type address the problem of 
reconciling quantum  theory with relativity by rejecting 
tha t the principle of local causality is implied by relativ­
ity; those of the second type tha t quantum  events and/or 
quantum  correlations are of a peculiar nature tha t just 
cannot be straightforwardly imbedded into the spacetime 
structure of Fig. 1 (Appendix).
In the following we will present a number of approaches 
of both types, although it will by no means be an exhaus­
tive list:
(1) A fundamental assumption of the causal structure 
of Fig. 1 (Appendix) is th a t measurements (i.e., the set­
tings and outcomes) can be associated with well-defined 
finite regions in relativistic spacetime. This assumption 
is needed so tha t we can assign to each measurement a 
certain point (or region) in space and at a certain time. 
One could choose to reject this assumption. But this has 
far-reaching consequences: one can then no longer speak 
of localized events, and it is unclear how one should pro­
ceed. Alternatively, perhaps we should adopt a s tra t­
egy where the wave function ceases to be a function on 
spacetime and instead becomes a functional on the set of 
spacelike hypersurfaces?
(2) We need perhaps revise our understanding of what 
(special) relativity in fact enforces? As Maudlin (2002, 
[18]) has stressed, we should distinguish between super­
luminal signals sim pliciter and superluminal signals that 
allow loops. And only the latter need give rise to in­
consistency with relativity. It thus seems tha t the only 
fundamental relativistic constraint is tha t of Lorentz co­
variance (Brown, 2005, [8 ]). All talk of super-luminal 
transmission, signalling, etc. appears to be besides the 
point.
(3) We need perhaps adopt an unrelativistic approach 
in any future physics because relativity has limited do­
main of applicability? Relativity could be only an emer­
gent theory from deeper level physics8, for example 
through a holographic scenario (Verlinde, 2010 [36]) or 
from a noncommutative geometrical theory which is non­
local with no space and no time in the usual sense, and
8 “It seems very likely th a t  relativity , like all o ther classical th e ­
ories, will eventually  be found to  be  an  approxim ation  to  some 
deeper and (stranger) quan tum  theory. [. . . ] I find it ra th e r 
surprising  th a t  so m any au th o rs  have espoused th e  notion of 
peaceful coexistence w ith such confidence. T he whole tren d  in 
physics in th is  cen tury  seems to  ra th e r obviously show th a t  th e  
u ltim ate  breakdow n of ‘peaceful coexistence’ is exactly w hat we 
should expect.” (Peacock, 1991 [25, p. 73]).
4tha t are to emerge only in the transition process to the 
commutative case (Heller and Sasin, 1999 [16]).
(4) Or is it the case tha t the problem arises because 
the current model of spacetime as a simple causal mani­
fold is inappropriate? The causal set approach by Sorkin 
and collaborators (see e.g. (Sorkin, 2010, [32])) seems 
to be promising in this respect. For them  spacetime is 
a discrete set of spacetime points partially ordered by 
causal connectibility, which grows by a stochastic pro­
cess of adding points to the future of the given discrete 
set; a causal set.
(5) Perhaps we can envisage a nonlocal ‘hidden’- 
variable model th a t ’performs the trick’ (Gisin, 2009 [12]) 
via some non-local influence in spacetime? However, any 
such attem pt is seriously hindered by the fact tha t any 
hypothetical nonlocal mechanism th a t procedures such 
an influence must be very, very fast (the speed of trans­
mission should at least be four orders (!) of magnitude 
faster than c (Salart et al., 2008 [23])). Furthermore, any 
such a mechanism cannot employ covariant non-local hid­
den variables A tha t are invariant under velocity-boosts 
tha t changes the time order of events (Gisin, 2010 [10]). 
The only viable option for a non-local mechanism is to 
assume the existence of a preferred universal frame of ref­
erence which univocally determines the time ordering of 
events. This seems to be a very unwelcome step to take, 
but it is unclear whether the introduction of a dynami­
cally preferred frame would lead to a gross violation of 
relativistic causality.
(6) Alternatively, should we find a new formulation 
of quantum  theory tha t manages to violate Bell’s local 
causality in a relativistically invariant way? Could, for 
example, Bohmian mechanics be made relativistically in­
variant? Or can we perhaps obtain some viable rela- 
tivistically invariant generalisation of non-linear collapse 
theories? Of the later type, the currently most promising 
theory is announced by Tumulka (2006, [34, 35]) who has 
provided a relativistically invariant dynamical reduction 
model for many noninteracting fermions. It is interest­
ing in this regard to cite Tumulka (2006, [34]): “...we 
seem to arrive at the following alternative: Bohmian me­
chanics shows tha t one can explain quantum  mechanics, 
exactly and completely, if one is willing to pay with us­
ing a preferred slicing of spacetime; our model suggests 
tha t one should be able to avoid a preferred slicing if one 
is willing to pay with a certain deviation from quantum 
mechanics.”
(7) Should we adopt a new theory of time and of be­
coming? Gisin (2010, [10]) claims tha t “quantum  events 
are not merely the realization of usual probability dis­
tributions, but must be thought of as true acts of cre­
ation (true becoming)” , and in a related paper (2 0 1 0 , 
[12, p. 1358]) he mentions: “To put the tension [between 
quantum  mechanics and relativity] in other words: no 
story in spacetime can tell us how nonlocal correlations 
happen, hence nonlocal quantum  correlations seem to
emerge, somehow, from outside spacetime .” 9 He con­
tinues (Gisin, 2010 [11]): “Note the implication for the 
concept of time. Quantum events are not mere functions 
of variables in space-time, but true creations: time does 
not merely unfold, true becoming is at work. The accu­
mulation of creative events is the fabric of time.” Can 
this indeed be worked out in a full-fledged and under­
standable theory of time and becoming tha t resolves our 
problem?
(8) Or can we find solace by merely interpreting quan­
tum  theory differently? In the Everett interpretation 
of quantum  theory the threat of non-locality is claimed 
to be absent 10: “[W]hen considering spacelike separated 
measurements on an entangled system [. . . ] there is 
no question of the obtaining of a determinate value for 
one sub-system requiring th a t the distant system acquire 
the corresponding determinate value, instead of another. 
Both sets of anti-correlated values are realised (become 
definite) relative to different observing states; there is, 
as it were, no dash to ensure agreement between the two 
sides to be a source of non-locality and potentially give 
rise to problems with Lorentz covariance.” (Brown, 2005 
[8 , Appendix B]).
(9) Finally, a serious option to consider is tha t a con­
clusive, and well-understood answer to the central ques­
tion can only be provided by a (yet to be obtained) full- 
fledged quantum  theory of gravity. However, we find this 
very unlikely, see next section.
IV. D ISC U SSIO N
The main point of this white paper is to argue th a t a 
good and fair case can be made tha t a basic inconsis­
tency exists between quantum  theory and relativity; an 
inconsistency tha t is not easily dealt with. Let us hope 
tha t one day the basic inconsistency be illuminated, per­
haps harshly, by some new exciting physics. Allow me to 
end this white paper with the following plea by Norsen 
(2009, [22, p. 293]):
“If more physicists would only study Bell’s 
papers instead of relying on dubious sec­
ondary reports, they would, I think, come 
to appreciate tha t there really is here a se­
rious inconsistency to worry about. A much 
higher-level inconsistency between quantum 
theory and (general) relativity has been the 
impetus, in recent decades, for enormous ef­
forts spent pursuing (what Bell once referred 
to as) “presently fashionable ‘string theories’ 
of ‘everything’.” (1990, [6 , p. 100]) How
9 It is unclear how we should understand  th e  phrase  ’h ap p en ’ here.
10 We believe, however, th a t  th is  approach is beset w ith fundam en­
ta l  problem s and its solution to  th e  p resent problem  to  be far 
from satisfactory.
5might a resolution of the more basic incon­
sistency identified by Bell shed light on (or 
radically alter the motivation and context for) 
attem pts to quantize gravity? We can’t pos­
sibly know until (perhaps long after) we face 
up squarely to Bells im portant insights.”
W hat is im portant here is not so much the appeal to 
read Bell—although one is strongly advised to do so— 
but that, instead of focussing on the higher-level incon­
sistency between quantum  theory and general relativity,
it could very well be a better idea to first resolve the basic 
inconsistency indicated here.
Thus, as indeed encountered so often, and here once 
again, the most elementary might not be the easiest to 
start with.
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A P P E N D IX : BELL’S N O TIO N  OF LOCAL 
C A U SA LITY
This Appendix 1 1  outlines Bell’s concept of local causality. 
This is done very carefully because, firstly, there contin­
ues to be great misunderstanding among the commenta­
tors regarding the status of the concept, and, secondly, 
so as to convince one of the “the plausibility, general­
ity, and evident appropriateness of Bells locality concept 
as an expression of the relativistic causal structure . . . ” 
(Norsen [21, p. 15]).
In the section entitled ‘Principle of local causality’ of the 
very last article Bell wrote on the foundations of quan­
tum  theory (published in 1990 and entitled ’La Nouvelle 
Cuisine’ [6 ]), Bell begins his explanation of the princi­
ple of local causality as defining the causal structure of 
relativity as follows: 12
“The direct causes (and effects) of events are near 
by, and even the indirect causes (and effects) are 
no further away than  perm itted  by the velocity 
of light.” Bell (1990) [6, p. 105]
11 T his A ppendix  is taken  from  Seevinck and UfHnk (2010, [31]), 
b u t also see Norsen (2007, [21]; 2009, [22]).
12 Here we will m ainly focus on B ell’s form ulation of th is  principle 
as presented in ’La Nouvelle C uisine’, Bell (1990) [6], T h is p re­
sen tation  we take to  be  th e  m ost definite and precise one Bell 
ever presented; it is overall consistent w ith earlier form ulations 
Bell used to  indicate th is  principle. See Norsen (2007) [21] for 
fu rth er e laboration  and su p p o rt of th is  claim.
FIG. 1. “Space-time location of causes and effects of events in 
region 1.” Figure (slightly modified) and caption taken from 
Bell (1990 [6, p. 105]).
This locates the causes operating in a certain region 
in spacetime in the backward light cone of th a t region 
and effects of anything occuring in tha t region in its for­
ward light cone. See Fig. 1. But Bell remarks, “[t]he 
above principle is not yet sufficiently sharp and clean for 
mathematics” . He then continues (see Fig. 2):
“A theory is said to  be locally causal if the prob­
abilities attached to  values of local beables in a 
space-time region 1 are unaltered by a specifi­
cation of values of local beables in a space-like 
separated region 2 when w hat happens in the 
backward light cone is already sufficiently spec­
ified, for example by a full specification of local 
beables in a spacetime region 3. It is im portant 
th a t region 3 completely shields off from 1 the 
overlap of the backward light cones of 1 and 2.
And it is im portant th a t events 3 be specified 
completely. Otherwise the traces in region 2 of 
causes of events in 1 could well supplem ent w hat­
ever else was being used for calculating probabil­
ities about 1. The hypothesis is th a t any such 
inform ation about 2 becomes redundant when 3 
is specified completely.” Bell (1990) [6, p. 106]
FIG. 2. “Full specification of w hat happens in 3 makes events 
in 2 irrelevant for predictions about 1 in a locally causal the­
ory.” Figure and caption taken from Bell (1990) [6, p. 105].
Although this formulation is considerably sharper, it 
is not yet cleanly formulated in terms of mathematics. 
Probably for this reason Bell introduces some further no­
tation and terminology in a subsequent discussion. He in 
effect introduces the space-time diagram of Fig. 3 that
7is a d a p te d  from  N orsen ’s (2009) [22] h igh ly  illu m in a tin g  
pap er.
FIG . 3. Space-tim e d iag ram  of th e  se tu p  Bell considers. For 
exp lana tion , see tex t. F igure ad ap te d  from  N orsen (2009) 
[22 ].
T his d ia g ra m  encodes th e  se tu p  Bell considers. I t  in ­
volves m easu rem en t on  a b i-p a r tite  sy stem  (e.g., tw o p a r ­
tic les em itte d  by  a source) w here each  p a r t  is m easu red  
by  a different party , conven tionally  called  Alice an d  B ob 
respectively. T h e  ou tcom es of m easu rem en t a re  rep re ­
sen ted  by  beab les A  (in reg ion  1) an d  B  (in  region 2) 
an d  th e  se ttin g s  chosen by  ex p erim en ters  Alice an d  B ob 
are d en o ted  by  beab les a an d  b respectively. T h e  sym bol 
A in d ica tes  th e  specification  of th e  s ta te  o f th e  b ip a rt ite  
sy stem  u n d er s tu d y  to g e th e r  w ith  o th e r  re levan t beab les 
in  th e  space tim e reg ions 3a an d  3b.
T h e  logic is now  as follows. C onsider a  c a n d id a te  th e ­
o ry  th a t  a t te m p ts  to  describe an y  co rre la tio n s found  b e­
tw een ou tcom es A  an d  B .  S uppose reg ion  3a shields off 
region 1 from  th e  overlap  of th e  p a s t ligh t cones of 1 an d
2, and , likewise, th a t  reg ion  3b shields off region 2 from  
th e  overlap  of th e  p a s t ligh t cones of 1 an d  2 (see F ig. 3). 
I t  is assum ed  th a t  (in th is  c a n d id a te  th e o ry  u n d er s tu d y )
A co n s titu te s  a  com plete specification  of th e  b eab les in  
region 3a an d  3b.
W ith  all th is  im p lic itly  in  place, Bell con tinues an d  
applies h is p rincip le  o f local ca u sa lity  to  th is  se tup :
“Invoking local causality , and  th e  assum ed com ­
pleteness o f . . .  A . . .  we declare red u n d an t ce rta in  
of th e  cond itional variables in  th e  last expression 
because th ey  are a t space-like separa tion  from  th e  
resu lt in  question .” Bell (1990) [6, p. 109]
T h u s th e  specification  of A m akes b o th  B  an d  b red u n d a n t 
for p red ic tio n  a b o u t A , an d  b o th  A  an d  a re d u n d a n t for 
p red ic tio n  a b o u t B .
T his finally  allows for a  clean fo rm u lation  in  m a th e ­
m atics  of th e  princip le. W e follow N orsen (2007) [21] in  
claim ing th a t  th is  indeed  gives
P „ ,6(A |B ,A )  
P a,b{B \A , A)
P a (A \X ),  
P b(B  |A), (1)
i.e., th e  cond itiona l p ro b a b il ity 13 of o b ta in in g  A  is inde­
p en d e n t of b o th  B  an d  b given th e  specification  A an d  
a, an d  ana logous for th e  p ro b ab ility  of o b ta in in g  B .  U s­
ing th e  defin ition  of cond itiona l p ro b ab ility  one triv ia lly  
o b ta in s  th e  cond ition
P atb( A , B \ X ) = P a(A \X )P b (B \X ), (2)
i.e., th e  jo in t p ro b ab ility  for o b ta in in g  ou tcom es A  an d  
B  fac torizes in to  a p ro d u c t o f ind iv idual p ro b ab ilitie s  
for th e  tw o sp a tia lly  se p a ra te d  system s, w ith  each  fac­
to r  con ta in ing  co n d itio n a liza tio n  on ly  on local beables. 
T h is  w ell-know n fac to risa tio n  cond ition  is th u s  derived  
from  th e  p rincip le o f local causality , ju s t  as Bell h im self 
s tre s se d 14.
13 Note th a t  th e  settings a, b a re  indices th a t  label th e  different
conditional p robab ilities, whereas th e  outcom es A , B  and A are 
random  variables th a t  can be conditioned on. See Seevinck and
UfRnk (2010, [31]) for a  detailed argum ent of why th is  is th e
app ro p ria te  no tation , instead  of th e  m ore com m on form ulation
where one also conditions on th e  se ttings and th u s  w rites expres-
sions like P (A ,  B \a , 6, A) and not P a b(A, i?|A) as is done here.
14 “Very often such factorizability  is taken  as th e  s ta rtin g  point 
of th e  analysis. Here we have preferred to  see it not as th e
formulation  of “local causality” , b u t as a  consequence thereof.” 
Bell (1990) [6, p. 109]

